Systematic Outcomes Analysis uses three possible contracting approaches which can be negotiated between funders and doers. The distinctions made here are based on the distinctions used in Systematic Outcomes Analysis regarding the different features of outcomes here. The three possible types of contracting arrangements are:
Arrangement 1: Accountable for outputs only.
In this arrangement, Doers are accountable only for producing specified outputs and nothing else.
Arrangement 2: Accountable for outputs AND for 'managing for outcomes'
In this arrangement, Doers are accountable for producing specific outputs AND also for 'managing for outcomes'. Managing for outcomes means that they also need to be thinking about whether their outputs are the best way that high level outcomes can be achieved and this includes the other factors which may influence high level outcomes and negate the effectiveness of their outputs. In this arrangement Doers are NOT held accountable for the achievement of high level outcomes. Exactly how managing for outcomes is defined is an interesting question as Funders/Control Organizations need to somehow work out whether or not Doers are actually 'managing for outcomes'. If Doers do this in diverse ways it is very difficult for funders to know whether they are doing it properly without emerging themselves in the details of the way it is being undertaken by particular Doers. It is rather like Funders/Control Organizations attempting to work out whether Doers are being financially responsible in a situation where there were no standardized accounting systems or accounting conventions. From the point of view of Systematic Outcomes Analysis a solution to this problem is for Funders to require that that Doers undertake a Systematic Outcomes Analysis of their funded projects and have these peer reviewed/audited, in an analogous way to what happens in the accounting area.
Arrangement 3: Accountable for not fully controllable outcomes
In this arrangement, Doers are held to account for not fully controllable outcomes, which sounds somewhat paradoxical. However exactly this does occur in the private sector. It is most suited to those situations where it is not appropriate, feasible or affordable to work out what can be attributed to particular Doers and where the Funder/Control Organization receives and directly benefits from the achievement of high level outcomes. In these cases the Funder/Control Organization is willing to share its increase in wealth with those who, probably (or possibly), but ultimately unprovably, influenced their good fortune.
Within this arrangement, Doers end up 'insuring' Funders/Control Organizations against the times when high level outcomes are not achieved and Funders/Control Organizations do not receive any increase in wealth. In those cases the Doer does not receive the bonus etc which they would have received if high level outcomes had been achieved. Therefore, Doers usually demand a premium from Funders/Control Organizations to manage their risk against those times when things go badly not due to any fault on their part. This sort of arrangement is in place for the salaries of top executives within the private sector. In the public sector, it is less likely to occur because those making decisions within Funder/Control Organizations do not usually personally benefit from achieving high level outcomes; many Doers need to collaborate to achieve many public sector outcomes; and politicians, taxpayer and the media are normally resistant to large sums of money being paid out to people in circumstances where there is the possibility that they may not have, in fact, 'earnt it'.
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